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Abstract
Background: In recent years, computer simulation models have supported development of pandemic influenza
preparedness policies. However, U.S. policymakers have raised several concerns about the practical use of these
models. In this review paper, we examine the extent to which the current literature already addresses these
concerns and identify means of enhancing the current models for higher operational use.
Methods: We surveyed PubMed and other sources for published research literature on simulation models for
influenza pandemic preparedness. We identified 23 models published between 1990 and 2010 that consider
single-region (e.g., country, province, city) outbreaks and multi-pronged mitigation strategies. We developed a plan
for examination of the literature based on the concerns raised by the policymakers.
Results: While examining the concerns about the adequacy and validity of data, we found that though the
epidemiological data supporting the models appears to be adequate, it should be validated through as many
updates as possible during an outbreak. Demographical data must improve its interfaces for access, retrieval, and
translation into model parameters. Regarding the concern about credibility and validity of modeling assumptions,
we found that the models often simplify reality to reduce computational burden. Such simplifications may be
permissible if they do not interfere with the performance assessment of the mitigation strategies. We also agreed
with the concern that social behavior is inadequately represented in pandemic influenza models. Our review
showed that the models consider only a few social-behavioral aspects including contact rates, withdrawal from
work or school due to symptoms appearance or to care for sick relatives, and compliance to social distancing,
vaccination, and antiviral prophylaxis. The concern about the degree of accessibility of the models is palpable,
since we found three models that are currently accessible by the public while other models are seeking public
accessibility. Policymakers would prefer models scalable to any population size that can be downloadable and
operable in personal computers. But scaling models to larger populations would often require computational
needs that cannot be handled with personal computers and laptops. As a limitation, we state that some existing
models could not be included in our review due to their limited available documentation discussing the choice of
relevant parameter values.
Conclusions: To adequately address the concerns of the policymakers, we need continuing model enhancements
in critical areas including: updating of epidemiological data during a pandemic, smooth handling of large
demographical databases, incorporation of a broader spectrum of social-behavioral aspects, updating information
for contact patterns, adaptation of recent methodologies for collecting human mobility data, and improvement of
computational efficiency and accessibility.
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The ability of computer simulation models to “better
frame problems and opportunities, integrate data sources,
quantify the impact of specific events or outcomes, and
improve multi-stakeholder decision making,” has moti-
vated their use in public health preparedness (PHP) [1]. In
2006, one such initiative was the creation of the Prepared-
ness Modeling Unit by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) in the U.S. The purpose of this unit
is to coordinate, develop, and promote “problem-appropri-
ate and data-centric” computer models that substantiate
PHP decision making [2].
Of the existing computer simulation models addressing
PHP, those focused on disease spread and mitigation of
pandemic influenza (PI) have been recognized by the pub-
lic health officials as useful decision support tools for pre-
paredness planning [1]. In recent years, computer
simulation models were used by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), and other federal agencies to for-
mulate the “U.S. Community Containment Guidance for
Pandemic Influenza” [3].
Although the potential of the exiting PI models is well
acknowledged, it is perceived that the models are not yet
usable by the state and local public health practitioners for
operational decision making [1,4-6]. To identify the chal-
lenges associated with the practical implementation of the
PI models, the National Network of Public Health Insti-
tutes, at the request of CDC, conducted a national survey
of the practitioners [1]. The challenges identified by the
survey are summarized in Table 1.
We divided the challenges (labeled A1 through A10 in
Table 1) into two categories: those (A1 through A5) that
are related to model design and implementation and can
potentially be addressed by adaptation of the existing
models and their supporting databases, and those (A6
through A10) that are related to resource and policy
issues, and can only be addressed by changing public
health resource management approaches and enforcing
new policies. Although it is important to address the
challenges A6 through A10, we consider this a preroga-
tive of the public health administrators. Hence, the chal-
lenges A6 to A10 will not be discussed in this paper.
The challenges A1 through A5 reflect the perspectives
of the public health officials, the end users of the PI mod-
els, on the practical usability of the existing PI models
and databases in supporting decision making. Addressing
these challenges would require a broad set of enhance-
ments to the existing PI models and associated databases,
which have not been fully attempted in the literature. In
this paper, we conduct a review of the PI mitigation mod-
els available in the published research literature with an
objective of answering the question: “how to enhance the
pandemic simulation models and the associated data-
bases for operational use at provincial and local levels?”
We believe that our review accomplishes its objective in
two steps. First, it exposes the differences between the
perspectives of the public health practitioners and the
developers of models and databases on the required
model capabilities. Second, it derives recommendations
for enhancing practical usability of the PI models and the
associated databases.
Methods
In this section, we describe each of the design and
implementation challenges of the existing PI models
(A1-A5) and present our methods to examine the chal-
lenges in the research literature. In addition, we present
our paper screening and parameter selection criteria.
Design and implementation challenges of pandemic
models and databases
Validity of data support (A1)
Public health policy makers advocate that the model
parameters be derived from up to date demographical
and epidemiological data during an outbreak [1]. In this
Table 1 A summary of the survey results on the challenges of practical use of PI models, as perceived by public health
practitioners
Challenge Description of the challenge
A1. Validity of data support Model parameters need to be derived from updated demographical and epidemiological data
A2. Credibility and validity of assumptions Models need to use credible and valid assumptions
A3. Represent human behavior Models need to incorporate human behavior
A4. Accessibility Models need to be easily accessible and run on personal computers
A5. Scalability Models need to be scalable to population specific data from regions of all sizes
A6. Awareness Available models and best practices need to be disseminated among the practitioners
A7. Action plan Need to translate models into uniform preparedness and response action plans
A8. Lack of resources Need to fund staff allocation and specialized training for model implementation
A9. Political implications Models need to consider second and third tier social implications of containment strategies
A10. Lack of mandates for models State and federal agencies need to develop mandates for use of model-based strategies
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port, such as data availability, data access, data retrieval,
and data translation.
To ensure data availability, a process must be in place
for collection and archival of both demographical and
epidemiological data during an outbreak. The data must
be temporally consistent, i.e., it must represent the actual
state of the outbreak. In the United States and other few
countries, availability of temporally consistent demogra-
phical data is currently supported by governmental data-
bases including the decennial census and the national
household travel survey [7-10]. To ensure temporal con-
sistency of epidemiological data, the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) has recommended enhancing the data collection
protocols to support real-time decision making [4]. The
frequency of data updating may vary based on the deci-
sion objective of the model (e.g., outbreak detection, out-
break surveillance, and initiation and scope of
interventions). As noted by Fay-Wolfe, the timeliness of a
decision is as important as its correctness [11], and there
should be a balance between the cost of data updating
and the marginal benefits of the model driven decisions.
Archival of data must allow expedited access for model
developers and users. In addition, mechanisms should be
available for manual or automatic retrieval of data and its
translation into model parameter values in a timely
manner.
In our review of the existing PI models at provincial
and local levels, we examined the validity of data that was
used in supporting major model parameters. The major
model parameters include: The reproduction number,
defined as the number of secondary infections that arise
f r o mat y p i c a lp r i m a r yc a s e[ 1 2 ] ;t h ep r o p o r t i o no ft h e
population who become infected, also called infection
attack rate [13]; the disease natural history within an
individual; and fractions of symptomatic and asympto-
matic individuals. The first row of Table 2 summarizes
our approach to examine data validity. For each reviewed
PI model, and, for each of the major model parameters,
we examined the source and the age of data used (A1a,
A1b), the type of interface used for data access and
retrieval (A1c), and the technique used for translating
data into the parameter values (A1d).
Credibility and validity of model assumptions (A2)
Public health practitioners have emphasized the need for
models with credible and valid assumptions [1]. Credibil-
ity and validity of model assumptions generally refer to
how closely the assumptions represent reality. However,
for modeling purposes, assumptions are often made to
balance data needs, analytical tractability, and computa-
tional feasibility of the models with their ability to sup-
port timely and correct decisions [5]. Making strong
assumptions may produce results that are timely but with
limited or no decision support value. On the other hand,
relaxing the simplifying assumptions to the point of ana-
lytical intractability or computational infeasibility may
seriously compromise the fundamental purpose of the
models.
Every model is comprised of multitudes of assumptions
pertaining to contact dynamics, transmission and infec-
tion processes, spatial and temporal considerations,
demographics, mobility mode(s), and stochasticity of
parameters. Credibility and validity of these assumptions
largely depend on how well they support the decision
objectives of the models. For example, if a model objec-
tive is to test a household isolation strategy (allowing sick
individuals to be isolated at home, in a separate room),
the model assumptions must allow tracking of all the
individuals within the household (primary caregivers and
others) so that the contact among the household mem-
bers can be assigned and possible spread of infection
within the household can be assessed. This idea is further
discussed in the results section through an analysis of
some of the model assumptions regarding contact prob-
ability and frequency of new infection updates that were
made in two of the commonly referenced PI models in
the pandemic literature [14,15].
Ability to represent human behavior (A3)
It has been observed in [1] that the existing PI models fall
short of capturing relevant aspects of human behavior.
This observation naturally evokes the following questions.
What are the relevant behavioral aspects that must be
considered in PI models? Are there scientific evidences
that establish the relative importance of these aspects?
What temporal consistency is required for data support of
the aspects of human behavior?
The third row of Table 2 summarizes our plan to exam-
ine how the existing models capture human behavior. For
each reviewed PI model, we first identify the behavioral
aspects that were considered, and then for each aspect we
examine the source and the age of data used, the type of
interface used for data access and retrieval, and the techni-
que used for translating data into model parameter values
(A1 a-d). We also attempt to answer the questions raised
above, with a particular focus on determining what
enhancements can be done to better represent human
behavior in PI models.
Accessibility and scalability (A4, A5)
Public health practitioners have indicated the need for
openly available models and population specific data that
can be downloaded and synthesized using personal com-
puters [1]. While the ability to access the models is essen-
tial for end users, executing the PI models on personal
computers, in most cases, may not be feasible due to the
computational complexities of the models. Some of the
existing models feature highly granular description of dis-
ease spread dynamics and mitigation via consideration of
scenarios involving millions of individuals and refined
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and validity of the models, this can also result in a sub-
stantial computational burden, sometimes, beyond the
capabilities of personal computers.
There are several factors which contribute to the com-
putational burden of the PI models, the primary of which
is the population size. Higher population size of the
affected region requires larger datasets to be accessed,
retrieved, and downloaded to populate the models. Other
critical issues that add to the computational burden are:
data interface with a limited bandwidth, the frequency of
updating of data during a pandemic progress, pre-proces-
sing (filtering and quality assurance) requirement for raw
data, and the need for data translation into parameter
values using methods, like maximum likelihood estimation
and other arithmetic conversions.
The choice of the PI model itself can also have a signifi-
cant influence on the computational burden. For example,
differential equation (DE) models divide population mem-
bers into compartments, where in each compartment
every member makes the same number of contacts
(homogeneous mixing) and a contact can be any member
in the compartment (perfect mixing). In contrast, agent-
based (AB) models track each individual of the population
where an individual contacts only the members in his/her
relationship network (e.g., neighbors, co-workers, house-
hold members, etc.) [16]. The refined traceability of indivi-
dual members offered by AB models increases the usage
of computational resources. Further increases in the com-
putational needs are brought on by the need for running
multiple replicates of the models and generating reliable
output summaries.
A ss u m m a r i z e di nt h el a s tr o wo fT a b l e2 ,w ee x a m i n e
which models have been made available to general public
and whether they are offered as an open or closed source
code. We also check for the documentation of model
implementation as well as for existence of user support, if
any. In addition, we look for the ways that researchers
have attempted to address the computational feasibility of
their models, including data access, retrieval and transla-
tion, model execution, and generation of model outputs.
Paper screening criteria
The initial set of articles for our review was selected fol-
lowing the PRISMA reporting methodology, as applicable.
We used the PubMed search engine with the keyword
string “influenza” AND “pandemic” AND “model” in
English language. A total of 640 papers were found which
were published between 1990 and 2010. We filtered those
using the following selection criteria (also depicted in
Figure 1).
- Articles that evaluate one or more strategies in each of
the mitigation categories: social distancing, vaccination,
and antiviral application. We limited the paper (by exclud-
ing models that do not consider all three categories) to
contain the scope of this review, as we examined a large
Table 2 Plan for examination of the design and implementation challenges of the existing PI models
Design and implementation
challenges
Plan of examination
Validity of data support (A1) for model
parameters
For each PI model and for each of the major model parameters (e.g., reproduction number, illness attack
rate) examine:
A1a. Data source for parameter values (actual, simulated, assumed)
A1b. Age of data
A1c. Type of interface for data access and retrieval (manual, automatic)
A1d. Technique to translate raw data into model parameter values (e.g., arithmetic conversion, Bayesian
estimation)
Credibility and validity of model
assumptions (A2)
For each of the reviewed PI models, examine assumptions concerning contact probability and frequency of
new infection updates
Represent human behavior (A3) For each of the PI models:
- identify the human behavioral aspects addressed,
- examine data support using criteria A1a through A1d, and
- assess the reasons for inadequacy of human behavioral considerations
Accessibility and scalability (A4, A5) For each PI model, examine:
- if the model software is available to general public (open source or closed source code),
- presence of end user support (user manuals, e-mail/phone technical support),
- information on the number of replicates needed for valid output,
- information on the running time,
- information on the ways to manage the computational load for implementing large-scale scenarios (e.g.,
the use of distributed and parallel computing),
- use of replicate minimization techniques, and
- type of interface for data access and retrieval (A1c), and data translation (A1d)
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drew their parameters (see additional tables).
- Articles with single-region simulation models. We
defined single-region for the purpose of this review as
either a country or any part thereof. Models presenting
disease spread approaches without mention of any regio-
nal boundary were included, as these approaches can
directly support decision makers at provincial and local
levels. There exists a significant and important body of lit-
erature that is dedicated to global pandemic influenza
modeling that aims at quantifying global disease spread
[17-20], assessing the impact of global vaccine distribution
and immunization strategies [18-20] and assessing the
impact of recommended or self-initiated mobility beha-
viors in the global disease spread [21,22]. As these over-
arching aims of the global models do not directly impact
operational decisions of provincial and local policy makers
during an evolving pandemic, we have not included them
in our final selection of articles.
- Articles that include data sources for most model
parameter values and, when possible, specify the methods
for parameter estimation. We included this criterion in
order to evaluate models with respect to the challenge of
“validity of data support.” See Table 2 where we outline
our evaluation plan. Clearly, models not satisfying this
criterion would not support our review objectives.
Using the above filtering criteria, an additional snow-
ball search was implemented outside PubMed, which
yielded 5 additional eligible papers [14,23-26]and
bringing the total number of papers reviewed to twenty-
three. We grouped the twenty-three selected articles in
eleven different clusters based on their model (see Table
3). The clusters are named either by the name used in the
literature or by the first author name(s). For example, all
three papers in the Imperial-Pitt cluster use the model
introduced initially by Ferguson et al. [27]. In each cluster,
to review the criteria for the design and implementation
challenge (A1), we selected the article with the largest and
most detailed testbed (marked in bold in Table 3). As sta-
ted earlier, credibility and validity of model assumptions
(A2), were examined via two most commonly cited models
in the pandemic literature [14,15]. The challenges A3-A5
were examined separately for each of the selected articles.
Out of the ten model clusters presented in Table 3,
eight are agent-based simulation models, while the rest
are differential equation models. Also, while most of the
models use purely epidemiological measures (e.g., infec-
tion attack rates and reproduction numbers) to assess
the effectiveness of mitigation strategies, only a few use
economic measures [26,35,39].
In our review, we examined epidemiological, demogra-
phical, and social-behavioral parameters of the pandemic
models. We did not examine the parameters of the miti-
gation strategies as a separate category since those are
functions of the epidemiological, demographical, and
social-behavioral parameters. For example, the risk
groups for vaccine and antiviral (which are mitigation
parameters) are functions of epidemiological parameters
such as susceptibility to infection and susceptibility to
death, respectively. Another example is the compliance
to non-pharmaceutical interventions, a mitigation strat-
egy parameter, which can be achieved by altering the
social behavioral parameters of the model.
Results and discussion
In this section, we present the results of our review of the
models that evaluate at least one strategy from each miti-
gation category (social distancing, vaccination and antiviral
application). We also identify areas of enhancements of
the simulation based PI models for operational use.
Validity of data support
Our discussion on validity of data support includes both
epidemiological and demographic data. Additional file 1:
Table S1 summarizes the most common epidemiological
parameters used in the selected models along with their
data sources, interface for data access and retrieval, and
techniques used in translating raw data into parameter
values. Additional file 1: Table S2 presents information
similar to above for demographic parameters.
Epidemiological data support
The most commonly used epidemiological parameters
are reproduction number (R), illness attack rate (IAR),
Initial set of articles filtered 
from PubMed using keyword 
search (n = 640)
Remaining articles (n = 28)
Exclusion of articles that do not examine 
pandemic influenza spread under a 
comprehensive set of mitigation strategies 
(n = 612)
Exclusion of articles that examine 
global pandemic spread (n = 6)
Remaining articles (n = 22)
Remaining articles (n = 18)
Inclusion of articles that meet the above  
criteria but are obtained using snowball 
search outside PubMed 
(n = 5)
Exclusion of articles that do not provide 
a comprehensive support for data 
collection and parameterization 
methods (n = 4)
Articles reviewed (n = 23)
Figure 1 Selection criteria for PI models for systematic review.
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asymptomatic infected cases. In the models that we
have examined, estimates of reproduction numbers have
been obtained by fitting case/mortality time series data
from the past pandemics into models using differential
equations [44], cumulative exponential growth equations
[7], and Bayesian likelihood expressions [27]. IARs have
been estimated primarily using household sampling stu-
dies [33], epidemic surveys [29,45], and case time series
reported for 2009 H1N1 [36,46]. The parameters of the
disease natural history, which are modeled using either
a continuous or phase-partitioned time scale (see Addi-
tional file 1: Table S1), have been estimated from house-
hold random sampling data [27,33,47], viral shedding
profiles from experimental control studies [23,43,48,49],
and case time series reported for 2009 H1N1 [36,46].
Bayesian likelihood estimation methods were used in
translating 2009 case time series data [27,46]. Fraction
of asymptomatic infected cases has been estimated using
data sources and translation techniques similar to the
ones used for natural history.
Recent phylogenetic studies on the 2009 H1N1 virus
help to identify which of the above epidemiological para-
meters need real-time re-assessment. These studies sug-
gest that the migratory patterns of the virus, rather than
the intrinsic genomic features, are responsible for the sec-
ond pandemic wave in 2009 [50,51]. Since R and IAR are
affected not only by the genomic features but also by the
migratory patterns of the virus, a close monitoring of
these parameters throughout the pandemic spread is
essential. Real-time monitoring of parameters describing
disease natural history and fraction of asymptomatic cases
is generally not necessary since they are mostly dependent
on the intrinsic genomic features of the virus. These para-
meters can be estimated when a viral evolution is
confirmed through laboratory surveillance. Estimation
methods may include surveys (e.g., household surveys of
members of index cases [52,53]) and laboratory experi-
ments that inoculate pandemic strains into human volun-
teers [54].
Areas of enhancement
Current pandemic research literature shows the existence
of estimation methodologies for IAR and R that can be
readily used provided that raw data is available [46].
There exist several estimators for R (Wallinga et al.
[55,56], Fraser [57], White and Pagano [58], Bettencourt
et al. [59], and Cauchemez et al. [60]). These estimates
have been derived from different underlying infection
transmission models (e.g., differential equations, time
since infection and directed network). With different
underlying transmission models, the estimators consider
data from different perspectives, thereby yield different
values for R at a certain time t. For example, Fraser [57]
proposes an instantaneous R that observes how past case
incidence data (e.g., in time points t-1, t-2, t-3) contribute
to the present incidence at time t. In contrast, Wallinga
et al. [55,56] and Cauchemez et al. [60] propose estima-
tors that observe how the future incidences (e.g., t + 1, t
+ 2, t + 3) are contributed by a case at time t. White and
Pagano [58] considers an estimator that can be called a
running estimate of the instantaneous reproduction
number.
Further extensions of the above methods have been
developed to accommodate more realistic assumptions.
Bettencourt extended its R estimator to account for mul-
tiple introductions from a reservoir [59]. The Wallinga
estimator was extended by Cowling [61] to allow for
reporting delays and repeated importations, and by Glass
[62] to allow for heterogeneities among age groups (e.g.,
adults and children). The Fraser estimator was extended
Table 3 Clustering of selected review articles based on model type
Model
cluster
Selected articles for review
Imperial-Pitt Ferguson et al. 2005 [27], Ferguson et al. 2006 [14], Halloran et al. 2008 [28]
Wu Wu et al. 2006 [29]
Ciofi Ciofi et al. 2008 [30]
Arino Arino et al. 2006 [31], Arino et al. 2008 [32]
UW - LANL Longini et al. 2004 [33], Longini et al. 2005 [34], Germann et al. 2006 [15], Sander et al. 2009 [35], Chao et al. 2010 [23], Halloran et
al. 2008 [28]
Gojovic Gojovic et al. 2009 [36]
LOKI -
INFECT
Glass et al. 2006 [24], Davey et al. 2008 [37], Davey et al. 2008 [38], Perlroth et al. 2010 [39]
Nuno -
Gumel
Nuno et al. 2007 [40], Gumel et al. 2008 [41]
Roberts Roberts et al. 2007 [42]
Influsim Eichner et al. 2007 [43]
USF Das et al. 2008 [25], Uribe et al. 2010 [26]
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tion number for a specific age class given infection by
another age class.
The above methods for real-time estimation of R are dif-
ficult to implement in the initial and evolving stages of a
pandemic given the present status of the surveillance sys-
tems. At provincial and local levels, surveillance systems
are passive as they mostly collect data from infected cases
who are seeking healthcare [64]. With passive surveillance,
only a fraction of symptomatic cases are detected with a
probable time delay from the onset of symptoms. Once
the symptomatic cases seek healthcare and are reported to
the surveillance system, the healthcare providers selec-
tively submit specimens to the public health laboratories
(PHL) for confirmatory testing. During the H1N1 pan-
demic in 2009, in regions with high incidence rates, the
daily testing capacities of the PHL were far exceeded by
the number of specimens received. In these PHL, the
existing first-come-first-serve testing policy and the man-
ual methods for receiving and processing the specimens
further delayed the pace of publication of confirmed cases.
The time series of the laboratory confirmed cases likely
have been higher due to the increased specimen submis-
sion resulting from the behavioral response (fear) of both
the susceptible population and the healthcare providers
after the pandemic declaration [65]. Similarly, time series
of the confirmed cases likely have been lower at the later
stages of the pandemic as federal agencies advocated to
refrain from specimen submission [66].
The present status of the surveillance systems calls for
the models to account for: the underreporting rates, the
delay between onset of symptoms and infection reporting,
and the fear factor. In addition, we believe that it is neces-
sary to develop and analyze the cost of strategies to imple-
ment active surveillance and reduce the delays in the
confirmatory testing of the specimens. In our opinion, the
above enhancement can be achieved by developing meth-
ods for statistical sampling and testing of specimens in the
PHL. In addition, new scheduling protocols will have to be
developed for testing the specimens, given the limited
laboratory testing resources, in order to better assess the
epidemiological parameters of an outbreak. With better
sampling and scheduling schemes at the PHL, alterations
in the specimen submission policies during a pandemic (as
experienced in the U.S. during the 2009 outbreak) may not
be necessary. The above enhancements would also support
a better real-time assessment of the IAR, which is also
derived from case incidence data.
Our review of the selected PI models indicates that cur-
rently all of the tasks relating to access and retrieval of
epidemiological data are being done manually. Techni-
ques for translation of data into model parameter values
range from relatively simple arithmetic conversions to
more time-consuming methods of fitting mathematical
and statistical models (see Additional file 1: Table S1).
There exist recent mechanisms to estimate incidence
curves in real-time by using web-based questionnaires
from symptomatic volunteers [67], Google and Yahoo
search queries [68,69] and Tweeter messages [70] and
have supported influenza preparedness in several Eur-
opean countries and the U.S. [67,69]. If real-time inci-
dence estimates are to be translated into PI models
parameters, complex translation techniques might delay
execution of the model. We believe that model develo-
pers should consider building (semi)automatic interfaces
for epidemiological data access and retrieval and develop
translation algorithms that can balance the run time and
accuracy.
Demographic data support
Additional file 1: Table S2 shows the most common
demographic parameters that are used in the selected
models. The parameters are population size/density, dis-
tribution of household size, peer-group size, age, com-
muting travel, long-distance travel, and importation of
infected cases to the modeled region. Estimation of these
parameters has traditionally relied on comprehensive
public databases, including the U.S. Census, Landscan,
Italian Institute of Statistics, Census of Canada, Hong
Kong survey data, UK National Statistics, National
Household Travel Survey, UK department of transport,
U.S. National Centre for Educational Statistics, the Italian
Ministry of University and Research and the UK Depart-
ment for Education and Skills. Readers are referred to
Additional file 1: Table S2 for a complete list of databases
and their web addresses. Our literature review shows that
access and retrieval of these data are currently handled
through manual procedures. Hence, there is an opportu-
nity for developing tools to accomplish (semi)automatic
data access, retrieval, and translation into model para-
meters whenever a new outbreak begins. It is worth not-
ing that access to demographic information is currently
limited in many countries, and therefore obtaining demo-
graphic parameters in real-time would only be possible
for where information holders (censing agencies and gov-
ernmental institutions) openly share the data.
The data sources supporting parameters for importa-
tion of infected cases reach beyond the modeled region
requiring the regional models to couple with global
importation models. This coupling is essential since the
possibility of new infection arrivals may accelerate the
occurrence of the pandemic peak [17]. This information
on peak occurrence could significantly influence time of
interventions. Some of the single region models consider
a closed community with infusion of a small set of
infected cases at the beginning [24,26,34]. Single region
models also consider a pseudo global coupling through a
constant introduction of cases per unit time [15,29].
Other single region models adopt a more detailed
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imported infections is estimated by the product of the
new arrivals to the region and the probability of an
import being infected. This infection probability is esti-
mated through a global disease spread compartmental
model [14,30]. The latter approach is similar to the one
used by Merler [17] for seeding infections worldwide and
is operationally viable due to its computational simplicity.
For a more comprehensive approach to case importation
and global modeling of disease spread, see [71].
Credibility and validity of model assumptions
Recall that our objective here is to discuss how the cred-
ibility and validity of assumptions should be viewed in
light of their impact on the usability of models for public
health decision making. We examine the assumptions
regarding contact probability and the frequency of new
infection updates (e.g., daily, quarterly, hourly) in two
models: the Imperial-Pitt [14] and the UW-LANL models
[15]. Choice of these models was driven by their similari-
ties (in region, mixing groups, and the infection transmis-
sion processes), and the facts that these models were cross
validated by Halloran [28] and were used for developing
the CDC and HHS “Community Containment Guidance
for Pandemic Influenza” [3].
We first examine the assumptions that influence contact
probabilities within different mixing groups (see Table 4).
For household, the Imperial-Pitt model assumes constant
contact probability while the UW-LANL model assumes
that the probability varies with age (e.g., kid to kid, kid to
adult). The assumption of contact probability varying with
age matches reality better than assuming it to be constant
[72]. However, for households with smaller living areas the
variations may not be significant. Also, neither of the
papers aimed at examining strategies (e.g., isolation of sick
children within a house) that depended on age-based con-
tact probability. Hence, we believe that the assumptions
can be considered credible and valid. For workplaces and
schools, the assumption of 75% of contacts within the
group and 25% contacts outside the group, as made in the
Imperial-Pitt model, appears closer to reality than the
assumption of constant probability in the UW-LANL
model [72]. For community places, the Imperial-Pitt
model considered proximity as a factor influencing the
contact probability, which was required for implementing
the strategy of providing antiviral prophylaxis to indivi-
duals within a ring of certain radius around each detected
case.
We also examined the assumptions regarding the fre-
quency of infection updates. The frequency of update dic-
tates how often the infection status of the contacted
individuals is evaluated. In reality, infection transmission
may occur (or does not occur) whenever there is a contact
event between a susceptible and an infected subject. The
Imperial-Pitt and the UW-LANL models do not evaluate
infection status after each contact event, since this would
require consideration of refined daily schedules to deter-
mine the times of the contact events. Instead, the models
evaluate infection status every six hours [14] or at the end
of the day [15] by aggregating the contact events. While
such simplified assumptions do not allow the determina-
tion of the exact time of infection for each susceptible,
they offer a significant computational reduction. More-
over, in a real-life situation, it will be nearly impossible to
determine the exact time of each infection, and hence
practical mitigation (or surveillance) strategies should not
rely on it.
The above analysis reveals how the nature of mitigation
strategies drives the modeling assumptions and the com-
putational burden. We therefore believe that the policy-
makers and the modelers should work collaboratively in
developing modeling assumptions that adequately support
the mitigation strategy needs. Furthermore, the issue of
credibility and validity of the model assumptions should
be viewed from the perspectives of the decision needs and
the balance between analytical tractability and computa-
tional complexity. For example, it is unlikely that any miti-
gation strategy would have an element that depends of the
minute by minute changes in the disease status. Hence, it
might be unnecessary to consider a time scale of the order
of a minute for a model and thus increase both computa-
tional and data needs.
Represent human behavior
Contact rate is the most common social-behavioral
aspect considered by the models that we have examined.
In these models, except for Eichner et al. [43], the values
of the contact rates were assumed due to the unavailabil-
ity of reliable data required to describe the mobility and
connectivity of modern human networks [24,37,38].
However, it is now possible to find “fresh” estimates of
the types, frequency, and duration of human contacts
either from a recent survey at the continental level [72]
or from a model that derives synthetic contact informa-
tion at the country level [73]. In addition, recent
advances in data collection through Bluetooth enabled
mobile telephones [74] and radio frequency identification
(RFID) devices [75] allow better extraction of proximity
patterns and social relationships. Availability of these
data creates further opportunity to explore methods of
access, retrieval, and translation into model parameters.
Issues of data confidentiality, cost of the sensing devices,
and low compliance to the activation of sensing applica-
tions might prevent the Bluetooth and RFID technologies
from being effectively used in evolving pandemic out-
breaks. Another possibility is the use of aggregated and
anonymous network bandwidth consumption data (from
network service providers) to extrapolate population
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[76,77].
Other social-behavioral parameters that are considered
by the reviewed models include reactive withdrawal from
work or school due to appearance of symptoms [27], work
absenteeism to care for sick relatives or children at home
due to school closure [27,36,38,43], and compliance to
social distancing, vaccination, and antiviral prophylaxis
[28,37]. Once again, due to the lack of data support, the
values of most of these parameters were assumed and
their sensitivities were studied to assess the best and worst
case scenarios. Existing surveys collected during the 2009
H1N1 outbreak can be useful in quantifying the above
parameters [78,79].
Recent literature has explored many additional social-
behavioral aspects that were not considered in the mod-
els we reviewed. There are surveys that quantify the levels
of support for school closure, follow up on sick students
by the teachers [78], healthcare seeking behavior [80],
perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, fear, general
compliance intentions, compliance to wearing face
masks, role of information, wishful thinking, fatalistic
thinking, intentions to fly away, stocking, staying indoors,
avoiding social contact, avoiding health care profes-
sionals, keeping children at home and staying at home,
and going to work despite being advised to stay at home
[81]. There are also models that assess the effect of self-
initiated avoidance to a place with disease prevalence
[21], voluntary vaccination and free-ride (not to vaccinate
but rely on the rest of the population to keep coverage
high [82]. Other recognized behaviors include refusal to
vaccinate due to religious beliefs and not vaccinating due
to lack of awareness [82].
We believe that there is a need for further studies to
establish the relative influence of all of the above men-
tioned social-behavioral factors on operational models
for pandemic spread and mitigation. Subsequently, the
influential factors need to be analyzed to determine how
relevant information about those factors should be col-
lected (e.g., in real-time or through surveys before an
outbreak), accessed, retrieved, and translated into the
final model parameter values.
It is important to mention very recent efforts in
improving models for assessment of relevant social beha-
vioral components including commuting, long distance
travel behavior [20,83,84], and authority recommended
decline of travel to/from affected regions [22]. For opera-
tional modeling, it would be helpful to adapt the
approaches used by these models in translating massive
data sets (e.g., bank notes, mobile phone user trajectories,
air and commuting travel networks) into model para-
meter values. In addition, available new methodologies to
model social-behavior that adapts to evolving disease
dynamics [85] should be incorporated into the opera-
tional models.
Accessibility and scalability
With regards to accessibility and scalability of the
selected models, we first attempted to determine which
of the simulation models were made available to general
public, either as an open or closed source code. We also
checked for available documentation for model imple-
mentation and user support, if any. Most importantly, we
looked into how the researchers attempted to achieve the
computational feasibility of their models (see Additional
file 1: Table S3).
Three of the models that make their source codes
accessible to general public are Influsim [43], Ciofi [30]
and FluTE [23]. Influsim is a closed source differential
equation-based model with a graphical user interface
(GUI) which allows the evaluation of a variety of mitiga-
tion strategies, including school closure, place closure,
antiviral application to infected cases, and isolation. Ciofi
is an open source model that is coupled with a differen-
tial equation model to allow for a more realistic importa-
tion of cases to a region. FluTE is an open source model,
Table 4 Factors that influence contact probabilities within mixing groups
Mixing group Factors that influence contact probabilities
Imperial-Pitt (Ferguson, 2006) UW-LANL (Germann,
2007)
Household Contact probabilities are constant Contact probabilities
vary with age
Neighborhood Mixing group is not considered Contact probabilities
vary with age
Workplace 75% percent of all workplace contacts occur within a workgroup of close
colleagues and the remaining 25% of contacts occur outside the workgroup.
Contact probabilities in both cases are constant.
Contact probabilities
are constant
School (pre-school, elementary, middle,
high, university)
As in workplace Contact probabilities
are constant
Community places, e.g., churches,
banks, supermarkets, afterschool
Contact probability between two members varies according to proximity Contact probabilities
vary with age
Prieto et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:251
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/251
Page 9 of 13which is an updated version of the UW-LANL [34]
agent-based model. The source code for FluTE is also
available as a parallelized version that supports simula-
tion of large populations on multiple processors. Among
these three softwares, Influsim has a GUI, whereas Ciofi
and UW-LANL are provided as a C/C++ code. Influsim’s
GUI seems to be more user friendly for healthcare policy-
makers. FluTE and Ciofi, on the other hand, offer more
options for mitigation strategies, but requires the knowl-
edge of C/C++ programming language and the communi-
cation protocols for parallelization. Other C++ models are
planning to become, or are already, publicly accessible,
according to the Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study
( M I D A S )s u r v e y[ 8 6 ] .W en o t et h a tt h ep o l i c ym a k e r s
would greatly benefit if softwares like FluTE or Ciofi can
be made available through a cyber-enabled computing
infrastructure, such as TeraGrid [87]. This will provide the
policy makers access to the program through a web based
GUI without having to cope with the issues of software
parallelization and equipment availability. Moreover, the
policy makers will not require the skills of programming,
modeling, and data integration.
The need for replicates for accurate assessment of the
model output measures and the run time per replicate are
major scalability issues for pandemic simulation models.
Large-scale simulations of the U.S. population reported
running times of up to 6 h per replicate, depending on the
number of parallel threads used [23] (see Additional file 1:
Table S3 for further details). It would then take a run time
of one week to execute 28 replicates of only one pandemic
scenario. Note that, most of the modeling approaches
have reported between 100 to 1000 replicates per scenario
[24,36-41], with the exception of [14,26,28,30] which
implemented between 5 to 50 replicates. Clearly, it would
take about one month to run 100 replicates for a single
scenario involving the entire U.S. population.
While it may not be necessary to simulate the entire
population of a country to address mitigation related ques-
tions, the issue of the computational burden is daunting
nonetheless. We therefore believe that the modeling com-
munity should actively seek to develop innovative meth-
odologies to reduce the computational requirements
associated with obtaining reliable outputs. Minimization of
running time has been recently addressed through high
performance computing techniques and parallelization by
some of the MIDAS models (e.g., Epifast) and other
research groups (e.g., DiCon, GSAM), as reported in [86].
Minimization of replicates can be achieved by running the
replicates, one more at a time, until the confidence inter-
vals for the output variables become acceptable [14,26].
In addition to the need of minimizing running time and
number of replicates, it is also necessary to develop inno-
vative methodologies to minimize the setting up time of
operational models. These methodologies should enable
the user to automatically select the level of modeling
detail, according to the population to mimic (see a dis-
cussion of this framework in the context of human mobi-
lity [20]), and allow the automatic calibration of the
model parameters.
Limitations of the review
There exist several simulation models of pandemic influ-
enza that can be used at the provincial and local levels
and were not treated as part of the evaluated models in
this article. Their exclusion is due to their limited avail-
able documentation discussing the choice of demo-
graphic, social-behavioral or epidemiological parameter
values. We mention and discuss their relevant features in
this manuscript, whenever applicable. For information
about the additional models, the reader is referred to
[86,88,89]. There also exist a body of literature evaluating
less than three types of mitigation strategies that were
not considered as part of the review, as we discussed in
the methods section. This literature is valuable is provid-
ing insights about reproduction patterns [90,91], effect of
cross-immunity [92], antiviral resistance [93], vaccine
dosage [94,95], social-distancing [96] and public health
interventions in previous pandemics [97,98].
Conclusions
Though the literature on pandemic models is rich and
contains analysis and results that are valuable for public
health preparedness, policy makers have raised several
questions regarding practical use of these models. The
questions are as follows. Is the data support adequate and
valid? How credible and valid are the model assumptions?
Is human behavior represented appropriately in these
models? How accessible and sc a l a b l ea r et h e s em o d e l s ?
This review paper attempts to determine to what extent
the current literature addresses the above questions at
provincial and local levels, and what the areas of possible
enhancements are. The findings with regards to the areas
of enhancements are summarized below.
Enhance the following: availability of real-time epide-
miological data; access and retrieval of demographical and
epidemiological data; translation of data into model para-
meter values.
We analyzed the most common epidemiological and
demographical parameters that are used in pandemic
models, and discussed the need for adequate updating
of these parameters during an outbreak. As regards the
epidemiological parameters, we have noted the need to
obtain prompt and reliable estimates for the IAR and R,
which we believe can be obtained by enhancing proto-
cols for expedited and representative specimen collec-
tion and testing. During a pandemic, the estimates for
I A Ra n dRs h o u l da l s ob eo b t a i n e da so f t e na sp o s s i b l e
to update simulation models. For the disease natural
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tion should occur every time viral evolution is con-
firmed by the public health laboratories. For periodic
updating of the simulation models, there is a need to
develop interfaces for (semi)automatic data access and
retrieval. Algorithms for translating data into model
parameters should not delay model execution and deci-
sion making. Demographic data are generally available.
But most of the models that we examined are not cap-
able of performing (semi)automatic access, retrieval, and
translation of demographic data into model parameter
values.
Examine validity of modeling assumptions from the
point of view of the decisions that are supported by the
model.
By referring to two of the most commonly cited pan-
demic preparedness models [15,27], we discussed how
simplifying model assumptions are made to reduce com-
putational burden, as long as the assumptions do not
interfere with the performance evaluation of the mitiga-
tion strategies. Some mitigation strategies require more
realistic model assumptions (e.g., location based antiviral
prophylaxis would require models that track geographic
coordinates of individuals so that those within a radius
of an infected individual can be identified). Whereas
other mitigation strategies might be well supported by
coarser models (e.g.,"antiviral prophylaxis for household
members”) would require models that track household
membership). Therefore, whenever validity of the mod-
eling assumptions is examined, the criteria chosen for
the examination should depend on the decisions sup-
ported by the model.
Incorporate the following: a broader spectrum of
social behavioral aspects; updated information for con-
tact patterns; new methodologies for collection of
human mobility data.
Some of the social behavioral factors that have been
considered in the examined models are social distancing
and vaccination compliance, natural withdraw from
work when symptoms appear, and work absenteeism to
care for sick family members. Although some of the
examined models attempt to capture social-behavioral
issues, it appears that they lack adequate consideration
of many other factors (e.g., voluntary vaccination, volun-
tary avoidance to travel to affected regions). Hence,
there is a need for research studies or expert opinion
analysis to identify which social-behavioral factors are
significant for disease spread. It is also essential to
determine how the social behavioral data should be col-
lected (in real-time or through surveys), archived for
easy access, retrieved, and translated into model para-
meters. In addition, operational models for pandemic
spread and mitigation should reflect the state of the art
in data for the contact parameters and integrate recent
methodologies for collection of human mobility data.
Enhance computational efficiency of the solution
algorithms.
Our review indicates that some of the models have
reached a reasonable running time of up to 6 h per repli-
c a t ef o ral a r g er e g i o n ,s u c ha st h ee n t i r eU S A[ 1 4 , 2 3 ] .
However, operational models need also to be set up and
replicated in real-time, and methodologies addressing
these two issues are needed. We have also discussed the
question whether the public health decision makers
should be burdened with the task of downloading and
running models using local computers (laptops). This
task can be far more complex than how it is perceived by
the public health decision makers. We believe that mod-
els should be housed in a cyber computing environment
with an easy user interface for the decision makers.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Additional file 1: Table S1 Epidemiological
parameters in models for pandemic influenza preparedness. The
excel sheet “Additional file1: Table S1” shows the epidemiological
parameters most commonly used in the models for pandemic influenza,
the parameter data sources, and the means for access, retrieval and
translation. Additional file 1: Table S2 Demographic parameters in models
for pandemic influenza preparedness. The excel sheet “Additional file 1:
Table S2” shows the demographic parameters most commonly used in
the models for pandemic influenza, the parameter data sources, and the
means for access, retrieval and translation. Additional file 1: Table S3
Accessibility and scalability features investigated in the models. The excel
sheet “Additional file 3” shows the different models examined, together
with their type of public access, number and running time per replicate,
and techniques to manage computational burden.
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